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Abstract
This paper introduces a dynamic coordination game with incomplete information defined
by a state variable that evolves stochastically. Incomplete information enables us to
use iterated dominance argument in order to resolve the indeterminacy issues. The key
endogenous variable is the belief that each agent holds about the state of the world. We
show that as agents update their heterogeneous beliefs through learning sequentially, they
adjust their beliefs to justify the status quo. This effect induces equilibrium actions that
support the status quo, a property we call hysteresis.
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1 Introduction
The challenge of explaining fluctuations or diversity using the notion of coordination
failure is in striking a good balance between an intuitively appealing story, and a rigorous
theory with clear predictions. Models with multiple equilibria are heavily biased towards
the former objective, prompting several game theorists in recent years to propose various
selection mechanisms. Unfortunately, by removing the multiplicity, some of these models
have lost the very engine to explain the phenomenon that they set out to address.
This paper attempts to resolve this dilemma by considering an alternative mech-
anism for fluctuations, drawing on other properties of a coordination game aside from
multiplicity. We take a game theoretic viewpoint that multiplicity is a problem that must
be dealt with. In a typical coordination game, there may exist multiple Nash equilibria
which are robust to small changes in the payoffs. In other words, there exists an interval
of payoff parameter, such that more than one equilibrium may be supported. To resolve
such indeterminacy, one may employ an equilibrium selection mechanism. This paper
adopts the global game framework, and presents a coordination game with a perturbed
information set where an equilibrium may be uniquely selected.
Because the game we study is dynamic in nature, the application of global game
technique is time-dependent. In particular, agents are able to observe the outcome of the
game in each period in the past and learn over time about the payoff structure of the
game. Global game analysis helps select an equilibrium from the initially indeterminate
set, but because the underlying belief is time-dependent, the resulting equilibrium also
exhibits a hysteresis property, namely the past matters. Hysteresis is in fact merely a
refined offspring of the multiplicity; the system may be locked in an equilibrium, but the
past helps uniquely identify that equilibrium.
Hysteresis is an important property of any fluctuations phenomenon, with examples
ranging from heat reaction of magnetisation in physics to business cycles in economics.
Over the business cycles, the booms and recessions are defined by NBER by the measure
of persistence; the economy needs to be doing well for a successive number of quarters
to qualify as an expansion. Stock market fluctuations are often described in terms
of bull and bear markets, suggesting that persistence or hysteresis is the underlying
property. Explaining hysteresis is an important, if not obligatory, step towards explaining
fluctuations.
Technically this paper introduces one way of taking global game analysis to a
dynamic level. We choose to focus on the interaction between the dynamics and the
posteriors which are central to global games, thus the payoff itself will be kept as simple
as possible. The selection procedure is based on the original insight of Carlsson and
van Damme (1993), but there will be some reservations regarding the effectiveness of
this technique in a dynamic model. These issues aside, the dynamic pattern of selected
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equilibrium is a substitute for multiplicity in explaining the fluctuations.
There are two especially related works to ours. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)
consider a model of bubble formation, where traders choose when to exit the market
given that they are randomly and privately informed of the bubble existence. Their
modelling technique of letting traders be sequentially informed of the bubble existence
inspires our choice of correlation structure between agents’ cost functions. However their
focus is on the tension between the incentives to sell assets early to secure lower but safer
profits, versus waiting to yield higher returns at the risk of the bubble bursting. Therefore,
in terms of payoff functions, their model is closer in spirit to a war of attrition than a
coordination games as considered here, and hence their persistence result is generated
by a distinct mechanism. As a result, there is no role for global game analysis in their
model, and the issue of uniqueness is bypassed by restricting attention to a particular
class of equilibria1.
Chamley (1999) on the other hand does use global game as a tool in his analysis of
regime switching, and is closer in spirit to our work. In his model there is an unobserved
exogenous stochastic variable defining a coordination game, and agents are forming
posteriors about that moving target. Initially, beliefs are becoming more diffuse over
time, as there is virtually no learning about the moving target, except that prescribed
by the exogenous process. In this sense, agents in Chamley (1999) lose rather than gain
information over time, and there is significant learning only late on, notably when there
is an information bang at a regime switch. In our model, the opposite is true; agents
learn and gain more information slowly. One implication is that the iterated dominance
argument applies relatively trivially in Chamley (1999), as more information diffusion
always ensures uniqueness. Also in our model, the stochastic variable is endogenously
determined by agents’ actions, a feature reminiscent of stochastic games (Shapley (1953)).
In particular, our model has a built-in notion of stability, in the sense that a coordinated
action that leads to a particular regime today, tends to shift fundamentals in favour of a
regime switch in the future. Our objective is to ask if learning can generate a hysteresis
effect that is strong enough to override such stability.
The paper is organised as follows. A dynamic coordination game is presented, which
still retains the multiple equilibria as in traditional models. The model is then subjected
to perturbation introduced to agents’ information sets as an equilibrium selection device.
Standard static global game exercise and sequential learning are then considered in
comparison. A solved example is presented as an illustration, and the last section
concludes.
1Incidentally they focus on the class of switching equilibria, which are guaranteed to be unique in
global games as shown in Carlsson and van Damme (1993).
3
2 The Model
2.1 General structure and state variable dynamics
Time t is discrete. There is a large population of size normalised to n, and we denote
the population set by [z, z + n]. There is a single consumption good, the stock of which
is measured in discrete units yt ∈ Y = {0, 1, ..., N}. At the beginning of period t, agent
i ∈ [z, z + n] decides whether to contribute to the production of yt, by choosing xit ∈
{0, 1} denoting inactivity and investment respectively. The evolution of yt is determined
by joint investment efforts of all agents,
∫
i∈[z,z+n] xitdi, and is modelled as a discrete-time
birth-and-death process on Y.2 Specifically, the transition rates are given by
Pr
(
yt+1 = y
∣∣∣∣yt,∫
i∈[z,z+n]
xitdi
)
=

bt for y = yt + 1,
δ for y = yt,
1− bt − δ for y = yt − 1,
where δ > 0 is a constant, and bt is an increasing step function
bt =
{
bh for
∫
i∈[z,z+n] xitdi > n− κ,
bl for
∫
i∈[z,z+n] xitdi < n− κ,
(2.1)
where bh > bl.
3 Any tie-breaking rule for the case when
∫
i∈[z,z+n] xitdi = n − κ can be
chosen without affecting the key results, and is omitted here for simplicity. Assume
that bh >
1−δ
2
and bl <
1−δ
2
, so that if the birth rate bt equals bh then the birth rate is
higher than the death rate (and conversely for bt = bl). Thus, aggregate investment in
period t determines the likelihood of an extra unit of y being produced or destroyed (by
depreciation) in period t + 1. If more than n − κ agents are investing, then yt is more
likely to rise than to fall in the next period. Accordingly, it is natural to think of bh and
bl as representing the boom (high) and recession (low) phases or regimes respectively.
2.2 Objective function
The good yt is a public good providing equal utility u (yt) to all agents for free in
each period t. On the other hand, contributing to the production of yt is costly. The
2A birth-and-death process is a Markov process where the state yt transits to yt + 1 and yt − 1 with
some transition probabilities called birth and death probabilities respectively. Transitions to other states
(within one period) occur with probability zero.
3Exogenous reflection applies at the boundaries, i.e.
Pr
(
yt+1 = N − 1
∣∣∣∣yt = N, ∫
i∈I
xitdi
)
= 1− δ
Pr
(
yt+1 = 1
∣∣∣∣yt = 0,∫
i∈I
xitdi
)
= 1− δ.
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contribution or investment costs differ across agents, and agent i ∈ [z, z + n], defined
explicitly as the agent with cost function ci (yt), incurs an investment cost ci (yt), if she
decides to invest in period t. However each agent who invests at time t will earn an extra
private lump-sum gain f at time t + 1 if yt+1 = yt + 1 (i.e. if the production at time
t is successful and yields an extra unit of goods next period). Therefore in this set-up,
choosing to invest amounts to buying a lottery that pays if and when yt goes up next
period. The extra return f provides private incentive to the production of yt.
The objective function of agent i at time t is then given by the lifetime discounted
payoff
Uit = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t [u (ys)− xisci (ys) + fis]
where β is the discount factor and
fit =
{
f if yt − yt−1 = 1, and xit−1 = 1
0 otherwise.
The cost functions ci (yt) are assumed to take the following linear form
ci (yt) =
βf (bh − bl)
θ
(yt − i) + βfbl, i ∈ [z, z + n] (2.2)
where θ > 0. By defining the cost as an explicit function of i, the identity index i
represents the cost ranking of agents (i = z being the highest-cost agent). The parameter
z determines the average investment cost of the population, and is therefore a measure of
fundamentals. Because the cost functions only depend on the difference yt−i, they satisfy
the quasilinearity property, i.e. any two functions are a horizontal parallel displacement
of each other. The fact that i ∈ [z, z + n] also implies a specific correlation structure
between the agents’ costs. Otherwise, there is no loss of generality in our parametric
choice, as free parameters θ and z capture the slope and intercept respectively. The
following assumption is needed for what follows, however.
Assumption 1. (Dominance regions) κ > θ + 1 and n− κ > θ + 1.
The assumption means that the size of a critical mass needed for a regime switch
is large relative to the size of a ‘coordination window’, θ. It is needed for establishing a
dominance region in lemma 1 below, which is an important prerequisite for the iterative
dominance argument used subsequently. The assumption will also help simplify the form
of beliefs held by agents (see section 7).
Figure 1 plots the cost functions ci (y) against R ⊃ Y .
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Figure 1: Cost functions ci (y)
2.3 Information structures
The information set of agent i at time t is given by
I it =
{
ci, {ys}s≤t , {bs}s<t
}
. (2.3)
That is, agents are informed of their cost functions, the current state, and past history of
state and regime. The observability of the past regimes is essentially a shorthand for two
joint assumptions. Firstly, agents are assumed to understand the dynamic structure of the
economy, i.e. they know the economy’s transition probabilities conditional on aggregate
investment. Secondly, agents are able to observe the aggregate investment only in the
past periods, and only imperfectly. Specifically, they can only discern whether aggregate
investment was greater or lower than the threshold n− κ in the preceding periods.
The information set specified in 2.3 is the case of primary interest, but in leading
up to it, it would be useful to consider the truncated version
I ′it = {ci, yt} , (2.4)
analysed in section 6. In this case, the agents are simply assumed to be memoryless, so
that any learning is forbidden.
The parameter z is assumed to be fixed, but unobservable. The correlation structure
is, however, common knowledge. As apparent in Figure 1, the correlation structure is
such that any set {ci (y)}i∈[z,z+n] is uniquely determined by the mean cost parameter
z. Therefore the information about the payoff structure of all agents amounts to the
information about z. If z were observable, then any agent’s information about her
opponents’ costs is complete. When z is not observed, all agents hold the same prior
that z follows a distribution H (z) (with density h (z)) on [z, z]. Let |z| ≡ z − z.
Assumption 2. (Diffuse prior: support) z ≤ −θ − n, and z ≥ N (implying |z| ≥
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N + n+ θ).
Assumption 3. (Diffuse prior: distribution) The density h (z) is atomless,
min
z∈[z,z]
h (z) ≥ α|z| , 0 < α < 1, (2.5)
and is uniformly bounded,
max
z,z′∈[z,z]
|h (z)− h (z′)| ≤ h, h > 0. (2.6)
The two conditions in assumption 3 are independent for α < 1 (if α = 1, condition
2.6 is redundant ). In the incomplete information case, each agent uses the prior H (z)
and the information set I it to compute an estimate for z, employing Bayes’ rule whenever
possible.
3 Interpretation and Applications
Let us discuss the idea underlying the model. An important feature of our model is
that the investment decision is cast as a coordination game. The fact that we do not
incorporate the investment decision directly into the utility function u (y) stems from our
intention to construct a coordination game version of an optimal growth problem. In
the standard optimal growth, Robinson Crusoe decides whether to plant coconuts (costly
investment), and he derives utility solely from the stock of coconut trees at his disposal
(yt). In our model, planting coconuts require joint efforts among many people, and the
key private incentive lies in the short-run gain in coordinating successfully. There are
several applications for this structure, and we outline two.
3.1 Business cycle
Firms decide whether to invest in new plants, which are only worthwhile if the aggregate
demand remains strong. Aggregate demand depends on the aggregate level of investment
by all firms. Firms derive a fixed amount of profit in every period that they remain
invested and the demand stays high. As the number of plants rises, the land price rises
and product prices fall, and it becomes more costly to invest. A firm may remain invested
despite the cost rise, if it believes that other firms are investing and thereby sustaining
the aggregate demand. Firms may or may not be able to observe the aggregate demand,
before it commits to an investment decision in each period. If each firm’s investment de-
cision is common knowledge, there may exist multiple equilibria in investment strategies.
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3.2 Asset price bubbles
A group of speculative investors with varying (privately observed) liquidity constraints
choose in the morning of each day whether to buy or sell some units of a given stock.
The price of the stock only move when there is enough buying or selling pressure from
the investors. Each investor’s payoff depends on the capital gain at the end of the day,
so that it pays to buy additional units of the stock if the price is expected to rise. When
the price is too low, many investors with excess liquidity may buy the stock regardless
of their expectations about the price movement, whilst for a very high price, the cost
of acquiring extra units may be too high for any liquidity position. When the price is
in an intermediate range, investors’ beliefs about the decisions of others are crucial in
determining their optimal strategies. It is possible that both buying and selling can be
supported as an equilibrium.
The indeterminacy, roughly capturing Keynes’ concept of ‘animal spirits’, is often
put forward as causing asset price volatility. In the context of our model however, the
volatility is explained as a bubbles phenomenon. Large swings in asset prices are caused
by rational investors trying to guess others’ liquidity positions by relying on past stock
prices. The stock price is inflated during a bubble because investors infer from observing
a high stock price that others have high liquidity.
4 Best Response Functions
In this section, we first show that the lifetime discounted payoff defined by the stock of
goods yt is subject to strategic complementarity, and hence our model is essentially a series
of coordination games with learning over time. Multiple equilibria exist in the complete
information case, leading to indeterminacy in the dynamics of yt in some range of initial
conditions. We then discuss the implications of incomplete information in this setting.
We investigate in particular the case where the only information available is the private
signal about own payoffs, without record of history. This particular case is susceptible to
the usual global games analysis (i.e. without sequential learning), and we carry out the
equilibrium selection procedure to highlight the role of incomplete information abstracting
from learning. Indeed, the case serves as a natural initial condition for a full model of
learning.
4.1 Best response and strategic complementarity
Agent i uses all information available at time t to form a belief about the value of bt,
expressed as a perceived probability over {bl, bh} . In view of this, let us define
piit = Pr
(
bt = bh| I it
)
(4.1)
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and
Eit (bt) = pi
i
tbh +
(
1− piit
)
bl.
The value of being agent i at time t, V (I it) , is given by
V
(I it) = max
x∈{0,1}
{
u (yt)− xci (yt) + β
[
Eit (bt)xf + V˜
]}
. (4.2)
To understand equation 4.2, note that u (yt) − xci (yt) is simply the period-t payoff
conditional on investment decision x. It is convenient to use x ∈ {0, 1} as an indicator
function, so that the private return in period t + 1, conditional on yt+1 = yt + 1 and x,
is simply given by xf . Thus, the expected private return in period t + 1 as of time t
conditional on x is given by Eit (bt)xf . V˜ is a summation of terms involving pi
i
t, bh, bl, δ
and the corresponding V
(I it+1) . When optimising, each agent takes V˜ as a constant, as
no single agent can unilaterally affect the evolution of the system.
It follows from the functional representation 4.2 then that investment (x = 1) is
optimal for agent i at time t if
βfEit (bt) > ci (yt) (4.3)
or, in other words,
piit >
ci (yt)− βfbl
βf (bh − bl)
=
yt − i
θ
(4.4)
That is, agent i will invest at time t if he believes the expected value of bt to
be sufficiently high, i.e. the probability of a high regime is high. But the expected bt
is high if and only if the strategy profile underlying the belief piit assigns a sufficiently
large number of agents to the investment strategy, as agents know the rule determining
the regime (equation 2.1). The payoff in each period is therefore subject to strategic
complementarity; the return to investment is increasing in the number of opponents who
are investing.
However strategic complementarity does not affect all agents’ decisions, as for any
agent i, a dominant strategy may exist for sufficiently extreme values of yt. In the
optimality condition 4.3, since Eit (bt) ∈ [bl, bh], x = 1 is a dominant strategy for agent i
if ci (yt) < βfbl, i.e. if yt− i < 0. Similarly x = 0 is a dominant strategy if ci (yt) > βfbh,
i.e. if yt − i > θ. Therefore any agent i ∈ [z, z + n] does not have a dominant strategy
if and only if yt ∈ [i, i+ θ]. Equivalently, for any fixed yt, the set of agents without a
dominant strategy is given by [yt − θ, yt].
The large population assumption abstracts the individual’s problem from complex
intertemporal considerations leading to the simple optimality condition 4.3. The full
dynamic flavour of the model, however, comes from the evolution of the belief piit. This
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depends on the structures of agents’ payoffs and the availability of information about
them.
4.2 Multiplicity under complete information
Suppose that z were common knowledge, so that agents know the costs of others (and
know that others know and so on), and hence are playing a coordination game of complete
information. To determine the equilibrium set, it is simplest to start by eliminating
dominated strategies. Let the κth-highest cost agent be denoted by
z∗ ≡ z + κ.
Consider Figure 2. Note that for yt < z
∗, at least n − κ agents have x = 1 as their
dominant strategy, and hence according to equation 2.1 bt = bh with probability one.
Inferring that the regime is guaranteed to be high for all states yt < z
∗, it is optimal for
all agents i ∈ [yt − θ, yt] to choose x = 1. On the other hand, for yt > z∗ + θ, more than
κ agents find x = 0 their dominant strategy, and bt = bl with probability one. Over this
range of states, agents i ∈ [z, yt] optimally choose x = 0, and the rest have a dominant
strategy to choose x = 1. Thus if iterated elimination of dominated strategies can be
applied, not only is a regime selected with certainty, but so are actions of all agents.
When yt ∈ [z∗, z∗ + θ], agents i ∈ [yt − θ, yt] do not have a dominant strategy, and
the regime bt cannot be established by the iterated dominance argument. Effectively,
agents i ∈ [yt − θ, yt] are playing a coordination game, and pure-strategy Nash equilibria
in which all agents i ∈ [yt − θ, yt] choose x = 0 and x = 1 (with corresponding phases bl
and bh) can both be established. Expectations are self-fulfilling and there is a multiplicity
of equilibria over this range as shown in Figure 2. The dynamics of yt is therefore
indeterminate.
The coordination problem arises whenever the agent z∗ does not have a dominant
strategy. It will turn out that agent z∗ plays a similarly pivotal role in the incomplete
information set-up. For these reasons, agent z∗ will also be referred to as the decisive (or
pivotal) agent.
The position of the indeterminacy range of yt under complete information is deter-
mined by the the fundamental parameter z. However, as long as 0 ≤ z∗ ≤ N − θ, the
length of the indeterminacy range is invariably given by θ. More generally provided that
z (and hence z∗) is not too extreme relative to n (one possible measure of the degree of
heterogeneity), the indeterminacy issue arises.
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5 Incomplete Information and Iterated Dominance
Consider an arbitrary case of incomplete information where the belief about z that each
agent i holds is given by a conditional probability distribution Pr (z > z′| I it). As long as
Pr (z > z′| I it) is a well-defined function of I it , the information set I it is arbitrary in the
present section, and needs not equal that given in equations 2.3 or 2.4. An equilibrium is
defined as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, with each subgame being defined by the date
t. Equivalently, the equilibrium can also be defined as a Markov perfect equilibrium,
where the state space Y is extended to include the beliefs that agents hold at each date
t. With this generalised state space, the game is a stochastic game and the dynamical
rule governing the state is specified by the learning process.
An equilibrium in our game can be characterised much more sharply than normally
possible for a general stochastic game. As mentioned earlier, the game is effectively
a sequence of static coordination games, each of which is susceptible to global game
selection mechanism proposed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993). This section estab-
lishes conditions under which a unique equilibrium in switching (Markovian) strategies
is obtained.
Global game method relies on iterated elimination of dominated strategies in se-
lecting an equilibrium, and requires the existence of dominance regions from which to
start off iteration. In our application, this requires that, at any date t, agents without a
dominant strategy i ∈ [yt − θ, yt] must believe that the decisive agent z∗ has a dominant
strategy with a positive probability. The next lemma establishes the condition for the
existence of a dominance region.
Lemma 1. At any date t, if every agent in the set [yt − θ, yt] believes that she is agent z
(z+n) with some probability, then she believes that the decisive agent z∗ has a dominant
strategy to invest (be inactive) with a positive probability.
Proof. Let agent i ∈ [yt − θ, yt] assigns a positive probability to herself being the highest-
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cost type z, so that she assigns a positive probability to the decisive agent being z∗ ≡
z + κ = i+ κ. Thus, agent yt − θ believes with a positive probability that
z∗ = yt − θ + κ
> yt,
where the inequality follows from assumption 1 that κ > θ + 1. In other words, agent
yt− θ assigns a positive probability to z∗ having a dominant strategy to invest at time t.
Since all agents’ costs are monotone in their indices, all agents i > yt−θ assign a positive
probability to z∗ > yt− θ+ κ > yt, so that any i ∈ [yt − θ, yt] believes agent z∗ invests as
a dominant strategy with a positive probability. An analogous argument follows for the
other dominance region, except that n−κ > θ+1 from assumption 1 is used instead.
The existence of at least one dominance region is essential for the game to be
solvable by iterated dominance. The following proposition is then a direct application of
the iterated dominance argument used in Carlsson and van Damme (1993).
Proposition 1 (Carlsson and van Damme (1993)). Let the belief that each agent i holds
about z at date t be given by a distribution Pr (z > z′| I it). Then at each date t, there
exists a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium surviving iterated elimination of dominated
strategies if and only if there exists a unique solution i∗ to the equation
Pr
(
z∗ > i∗| I i∗t
)
=
yt − i∗
θ
. (5.1)
Under such equilibrium, every agent i < i∗ chooses x = 0, and every i > i∗ chooses x = 1.
Proof. Only the decisions of agents i ∈ [yt − θ, yt] who do not have a dominant strategy
need to be considered. For an agent i ∈ [yt − θ, yt], the probability of the regime being
low, 1−piit, cannot be lower than her conditional probability of agent z∗ (and hence more
than κ agents) having inactivity as a dominant strategy, thus
1− piit ≥ Pr
(
z∗ < yt − θ| I it
)
piit ≤ Pr
(
z∗ > yt − θ| I it
)
. (5.2)
Suppose that Pr
(
z∗ > yt − θ| Iyt−θt
)
< 1, i.e. the agent yt−θ at state yt believes that he
has a lower cost than the decisive agent z∗ with some positive probability. It follows from
inequality 5.2 that piyt−θt < 1. However, for i = yt−θ, the R.H.S of equation 4.4 is 1, thus
the best response rule dictates that agent yt − θ must optimally choose to be inactive.
Iterated dominance arguments can be applied for successively higher i who take as given
that agents with lower signals will choose inactivity with probability one. Let i1 be the
smallest i such that inactivity cannot be established by iterated dominance arguments.
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Agent i1 ∈ [yt − θ, yt] knows that all i < i1 do not invest, thus 1 − pii1t cannot be lower
than Pr
(
z∗ < i1
∣∣I i1t ), implying
pii1t ≤ Pr
(
z∗ > i1
∣∣I i1t ) .
By definition, agent i1 must at least weakly prefer investment, thus i1 is the smallest
solution to the inequality
Pr
(
z∗ > i1
∣∣I i1t ) ≥ pii1t ≥ yt − i1θ . (5.3)
Similar iterated dominance arguments can be applied starting from where invest-
ment is a dominant strategy. Let i2 be the largest i such that investment cannot be
established by iterated dominance. Because the regime is known to be high for sure when
z∗ > i2, pi
i2
t is bounded from below by the (conditional) probability of this happening, i.e.
pii2t ≥ Pr
(
z∗ > i2
∣∣I i2t ) ,
combining with the definition of i2, we have i2 being the largest solution to the inequality
Pr
(
z∗ > i2
∣∣I i2t ) ≤ pii2t ≤ yt − i2θ . (5.4)
If there exists a unique solution i∗ to equation 5.1, it must follow that i∗ = i1 = i2,
and iterated dominance leads to a unique equilibrium in period t, where each agent
adopts a trigger strategy and invest only if her private signal exceeds i∗. This proves
the ‘if’ part. If there are more than one solution to equation 5.1, then i1 < i2 and the
iterated dominance argument cannot determine the equilibrium strategy played by agents
i ∈ (i1, i2). This establishes the ‘only if’ part.
When there exists a unique solution to equation 5.1, proposition 1 states not only
that there exists a unique switching equilibrium, but the equilibrium strategy of agent
i is necessarily Markovian with respect to the states yt and I it . The effect of history on
the current strategy is summarised by the current state yt and current information set
I it . Most importantly, proposition 1 simplifies the equilibrium characterisation problem,
suggesting that the key variable determining the equilibrium properties is Pr (z∗ > i| I it),
which is readily computable given the information set I it .
The proof to proposition 1 also implies that it is not necessary for there to be
two dominance regions, only that at least one exists. With only one dominance region,
iterated dominance can still lead to a unique equilibrium, but in that equilibrium all
agents in the set [yt − θ, yt] must adopt the same action as dictated by that dominance
region. For instance, if only a dominance region for the decisive agent z∗ investing exists,
then the unique equilibrium selected by iterated dominance would prescribe all agents in
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the set [yt − θ, yt] to investing.
6 Static Game of Incomplete Information
We begin by considering the case where the dynamics of yt is effectively suppressed from
the problem, either because agents do not observe the evolution or the state is assumed
fixed. In this case, the information set is limited to
I ′it = {ci, yt}
a strict subset of the set shown in equation 2.3. One immediate consequence of this
restriction is that Pr (z∗ > i| I ′it ) does not depend on t, since yt does not provide any
useful information about z. Accordingly, we may write
Pr
(
z∗ > i| I ′it
)
= Pr (z∗ > i| i) .
In this section only, we dispense with the dynamic issues, and focus on equilibrium
play at each state y ∈ {0, 1, ..., N} which defines a particular static game of incomplete
information. This exercise serves as a natural initial condition for the full problem where
no history is available, but can also be interpreted as a conventional static global game
analysis as considered in Carlsson and van Damme (1993).
Because the correlation structure is common knowledge, agent i ∈ [z, z + n] learns
from her private signal that z must take values on the interval [i− n, i]. Combining this
information with the prior about the range of z, agent i believes that z ∈ [i− n, i]∩ [z, z].
Let the state be fixed at y, and consider the beliefs of agents i ∈ [y − θ, y], i.e. those
without a dominant strategy at state y. Assumption 2 implies that
min
y∈{0,1,...,N}
min
i∈[y−θ,y]
(i− n) = −θ − n ≥ z
max
y∈{0,1,...,N}
max
i∈[y−θ,y]
i = N ≤ z
so that for any state y, agents i ∈ [y − θ, y] believe that z ∈ [i− n, i] ∩ [z, z] = [i− n, i].
Thus every agent updates her belief about z by truncating both sides of the publicly
available prior distribution of z using private signals. The length of the posterior’s support
is invariant to private signals, being equal to the population size n.
Given this belief, the posterior of z conditional on any state y and private signal
i ∈ [y − θ, y] is given by the truncated distribution on the interval [i− n, i],
Pr (z < z′ |i) = H (z
′)−H (i− n)
H (i)−H (i− n) . (6.1)
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6.1 Iterated dominance
Note that since each agents i holds an updated belief that z lies on the interval [i− n, i],
at any date each agent must assign a positive probability to herself being z or z + n, so
that lemma 1 applies and iterated dominance may be employed.
Let us define
H (i) ≡ Pr (z∗ > i |i)
=
H (i)−H (i− κ)
H (i)−H (i− n) . (6.2)
Because of assumption 3, that H (i) is atomless, H (i) ∈ (0, 1). Using equation 6.2, a
direct application of proposition 1 results in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For any fixed y, there exists a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium surviving
the iterated elimination of dominated strategies if and only if there is a unique solution
i∗ to the equation
H (i∗) =
y − i∗
θ
. (6.3)
Under such equilibrium, every i < i∗ chooses x = 0 and every i > i∗ chooses x = 1.
Existence of an equilibrium can be easily established in the spirit of Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem. Since over the compact interval [y − θ, y], the R.H.S of equation 6.3 is
linear with extrema zero and one, and H (i) always lies between zero and one, at least
one ‘fixed point’ i∗ is guaranteed if H (i) is continuous, which is obviously the case.
Lemma 2. There exists at least one solution i∗ to equation 6.3.
Some restrictions are required if uniqueness were to be guaranteed.
6.2 Uniqueness condition
By a contraction-like argument, it is easy to see that a sufficient condition for a unique
solution i∗ to equation 6.3 is that the infimum of the derivative of H (i) is greater than
−1/θ, or equivalently
sup
i∈[y−θ,y]
[
−∂H (i)
∂i
]
<
1
θ
. (6.4)
Differentiating H (i), one gets
−∂H (i)
∂i
=
h (i− κ)− h (i)
H (i)−H (i− n) + H (i)
[
h (i)− h (i− n)
H (i)−H (i− n)
]
.
We obtain a bound on sup [−∂H (i) /∂i] in two steps. First, we look for the upper
bound for the numerator of −∂H (i) /∂i. Using the bound on h (z) in assumption 3, this
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is given by
sup
i∈[y−θ,y]
{h (i− κ)− h (i) + H (i) [h (i)− h (i− n)]} ≤ h
To see this step, note that h (i)− h (i− n) can only be made large at the cost of making
h (i− κ) − h (i) small, due to the uniform bound. Given that H (i) < 1, setting h (i) =
h (i− n) and h (i− κ)− h (i) = h maximises the expression.
Next, we obtain the lower bound for the denominator of −∂H (i) /∂i. Imagine a
benchmark case of discontinuous density h (z) = h− h for all z ∈ [i− n, i], and h (z) = h
otherwise, where h = (1 + nh) / |z|. It is easy to verify using assumption 3 that the lower
bound for H (i) − H (i− n) is n (h− h) if h − h > α/ |z|, and nα/ |z| otherwise (i.e.
depending on which of conditions 2.5 and 2.6 in assumption 3 is binding). Thus
inf
i∈[y−θ,y]
H (i)−H (i− n) > max
{
n
(
h− h
)
,
nα
|z|
}
= max
{
n (1− h (|z| − n))
|z| ,
nα
|z|
}
.
It can be shown that h − h > α/ |z| if and only if h < (1− α) / (|z| − n). Hence,
combining the two bounds, we have
−∂H (i)
∂i
<
{
h|z|
n(1−h(|z|−n)) if h <
1−α
|z|−n
h|z|
nα
otherwise.
.
Therefore the sufficient condition 6.4 is given by
1
θ
>
{
h|z|
n(1−h(|z|−n)) if h <
1−α
|z|−n
h|z|
nα
otherwise.
. (6.5)
The parameter configurations determine whether or not the sufficient condition 6.5
is satisfied. Key roles are played by the parameters θ and h. Clearly the condition is
more likely to be satisfied for a small θ, and as θ is only bounded from below by zero,
a unique equilibrium can always be ensured by a sufficiently small θ, so long as other
parameters are finite. As for h, it is also easy to see that uniqueness always obtains in
the limit as h → 0, since the R.H.S of condition 6.5 tends to zero. This limiting case
corresponds to H (z) being a uniform distribution. More generally, because the R.H.S is
strictly increasing in h, one can always find h low enough that the sufficient condition
holds. These key findings can be summarised as follows.
Proposition 2. There exists a sufficiently small positive h (and θ) for which a unique
equilibrium is guaranteed for any given finite values of other parameters.
Consider the effects of n and |z|. As n becomes large, so that the first line of
the R.H.S of condition 6.5 applies, the R.H.S is smaller and uniqueness is more likely.
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The R.H.S is increasing in |z|, so that smaller |z| is more conducive for uniqueness.
The extent to which a unique equilibrium may result from a high n and low |z| is
however limited by the restriction imposed by assumption 2 that |z| ≥ N + n + θ.
Supposing that the restriction is just binding so that |z| = N + n + θ, the R.H.S of the
sufficient condition becomes “h (N + n+ θ) /n (1− h (N + θ)) if h < (1− α) / (N + θ)
and h (N + n+ θ) /nα otherwise”. Clearly as n → 0 (and |z| → N + θ), the R.H.S
explodes and the condition fails. On the other hand, as n → ∞ (and hence |z| → ∞),
the R.H.S becomes “h/ (1− h (N + θ)) if h < (1− α) / (N + θ), and h/α otherwise”,
therefore the sufficient condition for uniqueness may or may not hold depending on other
parameters. Lastly a larger α would make the R.H.S of 6.5 smaller, but α is itself bounded
by 1.
The parameter θ is intuitively a measure of the number of coordination games each
agent will potentially play. A smaller θ reduces the coordination problem, so that a
unique equilibrium becomes more likely. A smaller h means agents’ priors become more
diffuse, allowing the iterated dominance argument to select an equilibrium.
When a unique equilibrium obtains, let us denote the unique solution to equation
6.3 by i∗ (y).
6.3 Switching strategy and switching state
The following lemma states that when there exists a unique equilibrium in switching
strategies i∗, there exists a unique switching state y∗.
Lemma 3. Given that the condition 6.5 is met,
i∗ (y + 1) > i∗ (y) for all y ∈ Y \ {N} ,
and there exist a unique switching state y∗ (z) such that the phase is high if and only if
y < y∗ (z).
Proof. The second part of the statement follows since a sufficient condition for the
existence of y∗ (z) is that i∗ (y) is monotone increasing in y. For example, if i∗ (y1) > z∗,
resulting in a low phase, then the phase is low for all y > y1. Suppose, for convenience,
that y was a continuous variable, and implicitly differentiate 6.3 with respect to y to get[
∂H (i∗ (y))
∂i∗ (y)
+
1
θ
]
∂i∗ (y)
∂y
=
1
θ
.
The condition 6.5 guaranteeing uniqueness precisely requires that ∂H (i) /∂i is greater
than −1/θ for all i ∈ [y − θ, y], implying that ∂i∗ (y) /dy > 0 for any y. Using the same
argument for successively higher continuous values of y, it follows that i∗ (y + 1) > i∗ (y)
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for y ∈ Y \ {N}, and hence there indeed exists a unique switching state y∗ (z), provided
there is a unique switching equilibrium.
The unique switching state is characterised by
y∗ (z) = min {y ∈ Y | i∗ (y) > z∗} . (6.6)
Note that y∗ (z) depends on κ via two channels. A higher κ raises z∗ directly by lowering
the cost of the decisive agent and increases y∗ (z) for an exogenous reason. In addition,
i∗ (y) is decreasing in κ as agents are willing to invest more when a high regime is easier
to support. This is the endogenous channel through which a higher κ raises y∗ (z). See
also the uniform prior example in section 8.
7 Sequential Learning
Consider the full information set
I it =
{
ci, {ys}s≤t , {bs}s<t
}
as given by 2.3 where agents have memories and may use the history to update their
information about the payoffs of others. Private information includes an agent’s own
payoff and the history of play which is a record of the states that have been visited so
far and the corresponding regimes. In this set-up, agents therefore learn from private
information as well as sequential observations, and the analysis for this case must take
into account the dynamic evolution of beliefs.
The qualitative implications of the sequential learning case can be intuitively de-
scribed as follows. Suppose that (1) state yt is visited for the first time in a high regime,
(2) no higher state has been visited, and (3) there is no regime switch at the end of
period t. By observing that the regime has not switched at state yt, agents learn that
the average cost cannot be too high, and accordingly increase their posteriors that the
regime will switch at some state higher than yt. In other words, agents’ beliefs about
the fundamentals (average cost) become more optimistic in the absence of a regime
switch over time (as yt rises), since agents rule out the average cost being higher than a
successively lower threshold. Agents then invest with probability one at the visited states,
as their belief support is truncated by learning sequentially. The belief density over the
remaining support can still take an arbitrary shape, however, depending on the prior as
well as the sequential truncations. Therefore, any unvisited state can potentially be a
regime switching state depending on the skewness of the belief density. The objective of
this section is to determine the switching strategy and the corresponding switching state
as a function of the model’s parameters.
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To fix ideas, suppose throughout this section that the economy starts in a high
phase, which is determined by the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone strate-
gies as described in the previous section. The analysis for starting in a low regime is
identical as the model is symmetric.
As before, not all agents need to be considered at any given time, as some will have
behaviour dictated by dominant strategies. At time t and corresponding state yt, the
(assumed non-null) set of agents without a dominant strategy is given by
It ≡ [yt − θ, yt] ∩ [z, z + n] .
The fact that there is no phase switch in period t−1 implies that the decisive agent must
at least not have a dominant strategy to be inactive, i.e. z∗ ≥ yt−1 − θ. Since for any
fixed yt−1, yt is at most yt−1 + 1, we have z∗ ≥ yt− θ− 1, or z+n ≥ yt + (n− κ− θ − 1).
By assumption 1, that n − κ > θ + 1, we can conclude that z + n ≥ yt. Assumption 1
also implies n > θ, i.e. [yt − θ, yt] may be a strict subset of [z, z + n]. Thus, It is given
by
It = [max {yt − θ, z} , yt] .
It follows immediately that
sup It = yt ≤ N (7.1)
inf It ≥ z. (7.2)
7.1 Simple beliefs
Let the first period when agents have no memories be t = 0. The equilibrium phase at
the end of this period is determined by the (assumed unique) Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in monotone strategies as described in the previous section. Consider the next period
t = 1, when it is observed that b0 = bh. Because every agent follows a monotone strategy,
and period 0 is known to generate a high phase, everyone can deduce that the decisive
agent z∗ found it optimal to invest at time 0, i.e. z∗ ≥ i∗ (y0) , or z ≥ i∗ (y0) − κ. The
support of z in the information set of agent i in period 1 is then truncated to
z ∈ [i− n, i] ∩ [i∗ (y0)− κ, z] .
Lemma 4. For i ∈ I1 where I1 is non-null,
[i− n, i] ∩ [i∗ (y0)− κ, z] = [i∗ (y0)− κ, i] .
Proof. Three inequalities need to be proved. Using assumption 2 that z ≥ N and the
fact that sup It ≤ N , one obtains the first inequality i ≤ z for any i ∈ I1. Next, since
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a high phase in period 0 implies z ≥ i∗ (y0) − κ, the inequality inf It ≥ z must imply
i ≥ i∗ (y0) − κ for any i ∈ I1. Lastly, note that min [i∗ (y0)− κ] = y0 − θ − κ whereas
maxy1 maxi∈I1 (i− n) = maxy1 (y1 − n) = y0 − n+ 1. Since n− κ > θ + 1 by assumption
1, we have the last inequality i∗ (y0)−κ ≥ i−n for any i ∈ I1, and the result follows.
Hence at the beginning of period 1, each agent i ∈ I1 holds an updated belief on
the support of the form
z ∈ [i∗ (y0)− κ, i] . (7.3)
In other words, agents whose strategic decisions are nontrivial all learn additional infor-
mation from the first observation of phase history. In particular, all agents i ∈ I1 hold
the same belief about the lower bound for z, having observed an identical binding public
signal. They continue to hold diverse opinions about the upper bound however.
Shortly we will establish conditions under which the equilibrium play at the end of
period 1 may be determined using iterated dominance as in the previous section. The
beliefs that agents hold at the beginning of period 2, provided that there has not been
a regime switch, can then be determined by combining the existing and new (if any)
information generated by observing the play outcome of period 1. It is always feasible
to derive the dynamics of beliefs and the corresponding equilibrium play by repeating
this procedure. However note that learning from the equilibrium outcome in the first
period is one-sided in the sense that it provides a publicly observed lower bound to the
fundamental z, leading to updated beliefs of the form expressed in equation 7.3. Given
that this one-sided property continues to hold until there is a regime switch, there is a
reason to suspect that this particular form of beliefs may be held by agents more generally
in the subsequent stages of the learning process. A natural way to verify the conjecture
would be to check if this class of beliefs is a fixed point of the learning update mapping
on the space of all classes of beliefs. A more general definition of this class of beliefs will
therefore prove useful. Suppose that all agents observe a public signal at time t that
z ≥ ẑt, i.e. ẑt is the commonly observed lower bound for z.
Definition 1. Posterior beliefs about the value of z at time t are ‘simple’ if ẑt ∈ [yt − n, inf It],
so that each agent i ∈ It believes that z ∈ [ẑt, i].
If ẑt < yt − n, agents i ∈ [ẑt + n, yt] use i− n from their own signals (z ∈ [i− n, i])
as the lower bound for z instead of ẑt, whereas ẑt > inf It would imply contradictions
between private signals of agents i ∈ [inf It, ẑt] and the public ẑt. In other words, agents’
beliefs are simple if there is a public signal on the lower bound for z that is informative
to all agents who do not have a dominant strategy at the current state. For example,
lemma 4 shows that beliefs are always simple in period 1, with ẑ1 = i
∗ (y0)− κ.
We ask the following general question; given that agents initially hold simple beliefs,
which is true in the first period by lemma 4, what is the resulting equilibrium outcome?
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And given this equilibrium outcome, and supposing that the regime does not switch,
what form of beliefs will agents hold after observing such outcome? By answering these
questions, we establish whether the class of simple beliefs is a fixed point of the learning
mapping.
Under simple beliefs, the conditional posterior of z is given by
Pr
(
z < z′| I it
)
=
H (z′)−H (ẑt)
H (i)−H (ẑt) , (7.4)
for z′ ∈ [ẑt, i].
7.2 Iterated dominance under simple beliefs
Under simple beliefs, any agent i ∈ It holds a non-degenerate belief density that z lies on
the interval [ẑt, i], thus each agent assigns a positive probability to herself being z, and
thus at least one dominance region exists. Hence, lemma 1 again applies. For sufficiently
low ẑt, the other dominance region may also exist, but this is not essential for iterated
dominance argument.
Define for any i ∈ It
H (i, ẑt) ≡ H (i)−H (i− κ)
H (i)−H (ẑt) . (7.5)
H (i, ẑt) is strictly positive under the assumption that ẑt < z (so that ẑt < z ≤ inf It),
which will be shown to always hold true later (claim 1). However H (i, ẑt) is monotonic
increasing in ẑt and exceeds 1 when ẑt > i − κ. Despite H (i, ẑt) not always being a
probability measure, it is easy to see from equation 7.4 that Pr (z∗ > i| I it) = H (i, ẑt)
whenever H (i, ẑt) ≤ 1. Thus we have
Pr
(
z∗ > i| I it
)
= min {H (i, ẑt) , 1} .
Intuitively, when ẑt is high, agents may be positive that the decisive agent has a lower
cost than she does. The following corollary is immediately implied by proposition 1,
showing that the equilibrium outcome under simple beliefs can still be constructed using
the iterated dominance argument.
Corollary 2. Suppose that agents hold simple beliefs at the beginning of time t, and that
ẑt < z (beliefs are ‘rational’). Then iterated dominance leads to a unique equilibrium if
and only if there is a unique solution i∗ to
min {H (i∗, ẑt) , 1} = yt − i
∗
θ
. (7.6)
The unique equilibrium is a switching equilibrium defined by i∗, where every i < i∗ chooses
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Figure 3: Equilibrium switching strategy
x = 0 and every i > i∗ chooses x = 1.
The proof is again omitted. It is not unimaginable that H (i, ẑt) may be equal to 1
for an interval of (lower values of) i for some yt, resulting in a switching equilibrium with
i∗ = yt − θ, i.e. all agents without a dominant strategy decide to invest. The possibility
of a corner solution highlights the general implications of sequential learning; if agents
hold sufficiently optimistic beliefs about the costs of others (i.e. high ẑt) and yt is low,
then they may be absolutely certain that the regime will be high. On the other hand,
given that the economy starts in a high regime, the complementary corner solution where
all agents i ∈ [yt − θ, yt] choose to be inactive can never occur. This is because H (i, ẑt)
remains strictly positive under the assumption that ẑt < z ≤ inf It. Existence of an
equilibrium is still ensured, as H (i, ẑt) is continuous. The conditions for uniqueness will
be detailed shortly.
Denote the unique solution to equation 7.6, if one exists, by i∗ (yt, ẑt). Note that
H (i, ẑt) is increasing in ẑt, implying that i
∗ (yt, ẑt) is decreasing in ẑt. Clearly i∗ (yt, ẑt) is
increasing in yt. See Figure 3. Note also that H (i, ẑ1) > H (i) for all i ∈ I1 by virtue of
lemma 4. Having characterised the equilibrium play generated by simple beliefs, we now
turn our attention to the next-period beliefs generated by this equilibrium play.
7.3 Beliefs dynamics
Assume for the moment that at time t the belief posteriors take a simple form. Given
that there has not been a phase switch at the end of period t, agents can infer from
observing a high phase that i∗ (yt, ẑt) < z∗, i.e. that z > i∗ (yt, ẑt)− κ. Since the existing
beliefs are that z ∈ [ẑt, i], this new inference is a binding update only if i∗ (yt, ẑt)−κ > ẑt.
Thus, the dynamics of ẑt conditional on belief being simple at time t is given by
ẑt+1 = max {ẑt, i∗ (yt, ẑt)− κ} . (7.7)
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At time t + 1, the state may have evolved, and there may have have been a new set of
agents without dominant strategies. What beliefs will this new set of agents hold about
z, given the new public signal ẑt+1?
Lemma 5. Assume that in period t equilibrium is unique, the phase is high, and beliefs
are simple. Then in period t+ 1 the posterior beliefs remain simple.
Proof. The objective is to prove that given simple beliefs at date t, the set of beliefs
about the possible values of z at date t+ 1 is sufficiently bounded, so that it also takes a
simple form. Specifically we desire to show that ẑt+1 ∈ [yt+1 − n, inf It+1]. Consider each
bound in turn.
Upper bound: Since inf It ≥ z for any t, ẑt < z implies ẑt < inf It. Hence it is
sufficient to prove that ẑt < z implies ẑt+1 < z. Suppose that ẑt < z. Conditional on
the belief being simple and the phase being high at time t, it follows that i∗ (yt, ẑt) < z∗
and that ẑt+1 is given by equation 7.7. From equation 7.7, either ẑt+1 = ẑt < z (by
assumption), or ẑt+1 = i
∗ (yt, ẑt)−κ < z (since a high phase at time t implies i∗ (yt, ẑt) <
z∗). Thus ẑt < z implies ẑt+1 < z.
Lower bound: The targeted result is that ẑt > yt− n implies ẑt+1 > yt+1− n. Since
ẑt is nondecreasing as a function of t, the result obtains trivially for yt+1 = yt − 1 or yt.
Thus only the case where yt+1 = yt + 1 needs to be considered. Next, if ẑt > yt − n+ 1,
then ẑt+1 ≥ ẑt > yt−n+ 1 = yt+1−n, and the result holds. Hence the case that needs to
be checked is where yt−n < ẑt < yt−n+1. Under this constraint, the result holds if and
only if ẑt+1 = i
∗ (yt, ẑt)−κ > yt−n+1 > ẑt. But min [i∗ (yt, ẑt)− κ] = yt−θ−κ > yt−n+1
by assumption 1.
Combining the recursions for the two bounds, the lemma is proved.
Lemmas 4 and 5 together imply, by induction, that attention can be restricted to
the class of simple beliefs throughout the learning process up to the period when there
is a phase switch. Thus, a unique switching equilibrium in each period except the first
is determined by the solution to equation 7.6, with the corresponding belief posteriors
being completely characterised by the dynamics of ẑt according to equation 7.7. This
property will greatly simplify our analysis.
The proof to the lemma above also provides a useful result that ẑt < z implies
ẑt+1 < z. Since ẑ1 = i
∗ (y0) − κ < z, we have another small result that verifies the
rationality of our learning process.
Claim 1. Under any simple beliefs, ẑt < z for all t.
Since ẑt is increasing, ẑt edges closer to the true z over time. In section 7.5 below,
we shall show how the difference z− ẑt is related to the property of the equilibrium play.
In particular, it will be shown that there exists a limiting equilibrium where |z − ẑt| → 0,
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which implies that agents delay switching their actions to a maximum extent. However,
we first deal with the equilibrium uniqueness issue in the next section.
7.4 Uniqueness
In the class of static games with incomplete information, a unique equilibrium can always
be ensured by requiring the density h (z) to be sufficiently flat. It is natural as a starting
point to follow a similar contraction argument in this case. Recall that the method used
in such argument involves constructing an appropriate benchmark discontinuous density.
Differentiating H (i, ẑt) yields
−∂H (i, ẑt)
∂i
=
h (i− κ)− h (i) + H (i, ẑt)h (i)
H (i)−H (ẑt) .
For fixed h (i− κ) and h (i), the numerator is at its maximum when H (i, ẑt) = 1. Thus
sup [h (i− κ)− h (i) + H (i, ẑt)h (i)] ≤ suph (i− κ) .
Note that for any fixed inf h (z), suph (z) = inf h (z) + h by the uniform boundedness
assumption. In other words, when H (i, ẑt) = 1, the numerator is maximised only if
the uniform boundedness condition is binding. Consider a benchmark case obeying such
restriction, where h (z) = h− h for z ∈ [ẑt, i] \ {i− κ}, and h (z) = h otherwise. Defining
ît ≡ i− ẑt
for notational simplicity, we have h =
(
1 + îth
)
/ |z| so that the probability density is
well-defined. Supposing that only the uniform boundedness condition is binding and not
the atomlessness assumption, i.e. inf h (z) > α/ |z|, this benchmark serves as an upper
bound for −∂H (i, ẑt) /∂i, since the numerator h (i− κ) = h is maximised subject to
inf h (z) = h− h, and the denominator is minimised subject to the uniform boundedness
binding. Thus when suph (z) = inf h (z) + h and inf h (z) > α/ |z|, we have
−∂H (i, ẑt)
∂i
<
h
ît
(
h− h
)
=
1 + îth
ît
(
1− h
(
|z| − ît
)) .
On the other hand, the atomlessness condition may also be binding, in which case we
consider the benchmark where h (z) = α/ |z| for z ∈ [ẑt, i] \ {i− κ}, h (i− κ) = α/ |z|+h,
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and h (z) =
(
|z| − α̂it
)
/ |z|
(
|z| − ît
)
otherwise. Under this scenario we have
−∂H (i, ẑt)
∂i
<
α + h |z|
α̂it
.
To summarise we have
−∂H (i, ẑt)
∂i
<

1+îth
ît(1−h(|z|−ît))
if h <
1−α
|z|−ît
α+h|z|
α̂it
otherwise.
As before, the contraction argument requires the upper bound to be less than 1/θ, to
ensure a unique equilibrium.
The functional form of this upper bound differs fundamentally from the static
counterpart. Most importantly, the upper bound may now evolve over time. It can easily
be shown that the upper bound is strictly decreasing in ît. Since the belief dynamics ẑt
is non-decreasing, ît is decreasing with time, and hence the upper bound is an increasing
function of time. For instance, in the extreme case of ît → 0 (i.e. when i and ẑt tend to z,
which cannot be ruled out), the upper bound tends to infinity. The sufficient condition for
uniqueness may therefore only be met up to a period, after which indeterminacy surfaces.
Intuitively sequential learning allows agents to accumulate more information over time
about the game that they are playing. As the posteriors become less diffuse, iterated
dominance may eventually fail.
Given that the sufficient condition becomes more demanding over time, it is natural
to ask if a unique equilibrium can be guaranteed for any set of parameters at all. Although
the bound is monotonic increasing in h so that the bound may be made small by lowering
h, its limit as h → 0 is given by 1/̂it, which may tend to infinity as mentioned above.
With sequential learning, −∂H (i, ẑt) /∂i is not bounded everywhere, and a uniqueness
argument based on contraction of H (i, ẑt) does not suffice. It will be noticed immediately
however, that since the L.H.S of the equilibrium condition 7.6 is max {H (i, ẑt) , 1} and
not H (i, ẑt), −∂H (i, ẑt) /∂i only needs to be bounded for H (i, ẑt) < 1 for a unique
equilibrium to obtain, as max {H (i, ẑt) , 1} does not vary with i for H (i, ẑt) ≥ 1. By
definition, H (i, ẑt) < 1 if and only if ît > κ. Thus, when H (i, ẑt) < 1, the limiting upper
bound for −∂H (i, ẑt) /∂i as h → 0 cannot be greater than 1/κ. Invoking assumption
1, it is clear that the limiting upper bound is strictly less than 1/θ, and hence a unique
equilibrium is always ensured in the limit. We summarise this conclusion by the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Under assumption 1, as h → 0 there exists a unique equilibrium in
every stage of the sequential learning until there is a regime switch.
It should be stressed that the upper bound obtained for −∂H (i, ẑt) /∂i, which itself
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may not be the tightest possible, only serves as a sufficient condition for uniqueness.
Proposition 3 does not rule out a unique equilibrium when −∂H (i, ẑt) /∂i > 1/θ; for
example if H (i, ẑt) ≥ 1 for all i ∈ [yt − θ, yt], then a unique corner solution exists
regardless of ∂H (i, ẑt) /∂i. The strong requirement that h = 0 is not always necessary
for the uniqueness. The result above merely states that regardless of other features of the
prior distribution, indeterminacy can be ruled out solely by a sufficiently small h, zero
being sufficient for all circumstances, a conclusion that is analogous to proposition 2 of
the static case.
7.5 Hysteresis
Under static games of incomplete information, it is found that the switching state is
given by y∗ (z) in equation 6.6, where it is not unreasonable given moderate κ that
y∗ (z) should lie comfortably in the interior of the interval [z∗, z∗ + θ]. The qualitative
difference between this benchmark case and the sequential learning is not hard to see. By
implication of lemma 4, we have H (i, ẑt) > H (i) which implies that i
∗ (yt, ẑt) < i∗ (yt),
so that it is possible for the regime to be high when agents observe ẑt, but low when
agents can only use the prior. In this sense, being able to observe a high regime in the
past is more favourable for the regime to be high in the current period. Moreover, since
i∗ (yt, ẑt) is decreasing in ẑt and ẑt is increasing over time, for any fixed y we also have
i∗ (y, ẑt) ≤ i∗ (y, ẑt+1), i.e. more learning tends to delay a regime switch. This effect is
what we mean by hysteresis ; having been in a particular regime, agents rationally hold
beliefs about the fundamental favouring that regime, and accordingly coordinate on an
action that tend to sustain the status quo.
Having observed that the equilibrium regime exhibits a hysteresis property, it is
natural to quantify its effect. How long can a high regime survive under sequential
learning? We know that a high regime cannot continue after state yt = z
∗+ θ is reached,
as by then the decisive agent would stop investing as a dominant strategy. As a starting
point, can one rule out the extreme outcome of ‘maximum hysteresis’ where the high
regime still remains at the corner state yt = z
∗ + θ (ignoring the integer constraint for
simplicity)? Assuming that a unique switching equilibrium is guaranteed, and that there
has been no regime switch earlier, the regime will remain high at yt = z
∗ + θ if and only
if agent z∗ invests, i.e. H (z∗, ẑt) ≥ 1, so that the unique solution is a corner solution. By
definition of H (z∗, ẑt), this inequality is satisfied when ẑt ≥ z. As claim 1 forbids ẑt > z,
the condition is given by ẑt = z. In fact when ẑt = z, the unique equilibrium is a corner
solution for all yt ≤ z∗ + θ. This follows because, in our model, once a corner solution is
obtained as an equilibrium, it will remain an equilibrium until there is a regime switch.
In sum, when learning is exhausted so that agents hold a lower bound belief ẑt that is
identical to the true z, there could be a maximum delay in the regime switching, provided
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there has not been a regime switch previously.
Claim 2. ẑt = z guarantees a high regime at state yt = z
∗ + θ, provided there has not
been a regime switch before period t.
The requirement that there has not been a regime switch is an important one. For
instance, ẑt may be equal to z potentially causing a maximum delay at time t if it was
reached, but if ẑt−1 is far smaller than ẑt, there might well be a regime switch at time
t−1. In other words, the actual degree of hysteresis may depend on the frequency of belief
updates, with infrequent updates potentially reducing the degree of hysteresis. Thus even
if in general a higher ẑt results in a longer delay other things being equal, it is difficult
to fully address the issue of hysteresis without considering the dynamics of the system as
a whole. To assess the quantitative effect of hysteresis, one must track the evolution of
beliefs. We now introduce a simple device for this purpose.
Assume that a unique equilibrium always obtains, and consider the dynamics of
i∗ (yt, ẑt). We know that i∗ (yt, ẑt) is increasing in yt and decreasing in ẑt, but both yt
and ẑt tend to grow over time given a high regime leaving the net effect on i
∗ (yt, ẑt)
ambiguous. Intuitively, as yt rises, agents are less willing to tolerate a high investment,
but they also hold a more positive view about the fundamental from past learning. Which
effect dominates? In answering this question, it is helpful to explicitly work out how yt
and ẑt coevolve. In a manner analogous to lemma 3, it is possible to reformulate the
learning dynamics ẑt in terms of the dynamics of the underlying state variable yt, i.e. ẑt
and yt are perfectly coupled. The dynamical rule 7.7 says that additional information is
learned from observing the phase bt if and only if ẑt+1 > ẑt.
Claim 3. A necessary condition for ẑt+1 > ẑt is that yt > yt−1.
Proof. By lemma 4, there is always a new information from observing b0, with ẑ1 =
i∗ (y0) − κ. Consider first whether there will be a learning of extra information from
observing b1. By lemma 4, H (i, ẑ1) > H (i), and thus i
∗ (y, ẑt) < i∗ (y). Observing b1
yields a new information if i∗ (y1, ẑ1) > i∗ (y0), which may hold only if y1 > y0 as i∗ (yt, ẑt)
is increasing in yt.
There is a new information learned from observing bt only if i
∗ (yt, ẑt) > i∗ (yt−1, ẑt−1).
According to the beliefs dynamics 7.7, ẑt ≥ ẑt−1 (with strict inequality if there was a
learning of additional information from observing bt−1), so that i∗ (yt, ẑt) ≤ i∗ (yt, ẑt−1) as
i∗ (yt, ẑt) is decreasing in ẑt. Since i∗ (yt, ẑt) is increasing in yt, i∗ (yt, ẑt) > i∗ (yt−1, ẑt−1)
may hold only if yt = yt−1 + 1.
Claim 3 suggests that we can construct two increasing sequences ẑ0 < ẑ1 < ... < ẑj,
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and y0 < y1 < ... < yj, where
ẑ0 = ẑ1 = i
∗ (y0)− κ
ẑj = i∗
(
yj−1, ẑj−1
)− κ, for j = 1, 2, ... (7.8)
and
y0 = min
{
y ∈ Y | i∗ (y, ẑ0) > i∗ (y0)}
yj = min
{
y ∈ Y | i∗ (y, ẑj) > i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1)} , for j = 1, 2, ... (7.9)
Thus the sequence {yj} lists all the states at which there is a learning update, whilst {ẑj}
records all the distinct beliefs formed over the learning process. These sequences or stages
exist independently of the dynamic paths that yt and ẑt may take in any realisation. They
express beliefs as a function of states visited in the past rather than time itself. Define
the switching stage j∗ as
j∗ = min
j
{
j = 0, 1, ...| i∗ (yj, ẑj) > z∗} . (7.10)
It is clear that a phase switch takes place when state yj
∗
is reached from below for the
first time. In other words, yj
∗
is the switching state under sequential learning. Clearly
by the construction of the sequences {ẑj} and {yj}, i∗ (yj, ẑj) is an increasing function of
the index j.
The extent of hysteresis may now be reassessed quantitatively. In general, the size
of hysteresis grows with ẑj, and ẑj rises because successively higher yj yields more infor-
mation via higher i∗ (yj, ẑj). Note that from equations 7.8 we have ẑj and i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1)
being linearly related with slope one for each j, where
ẑj+1 − ẑj = i∗ (yj, ẑj)− i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1) , j = 1, 2, ...
ẑ1 − ẑ0 = i∗ (y0, ẑ0)− i∗ (y0) .
That is, ẑj and i∗ (yj−1, ẑj − 1) increase in each stage exactly by the same amount. In
fact, it can be seen from equations 7.8 that as i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1) approaches the threshold z∗,
ẑj tends to its upper bound z. Thus, as a regime switch becomes more imminent, agents’
beliefs also tend to the most optimistic level possible under rational learning, which
can support a high regime up to the dominant-strategy range. The degree of hysteresis
can therefore potentially reach its maximum size provided that i∗ (yj, ẑj) approaches z∗
sufficiently slowly.
The actual degree of hysteresis depends on how large i∗ (yj, ẑj) can jump in each
stage. If i∗ (yj, ẑj) is much larger than i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1), it is possible that there is a phase
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Figure 4: Maximum hysteresis
switch at stage j although i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1) is much lower than the threshold z∗ (i.e. ẑj
much lower than z). In such case, hysteresis is short-lived, as i∗ (yj, ẑj) jumps beyond
the threshold before ẑj+1 gets a chance to grow closer to z to sustain the high regime.
To determine how large can i∗ (yj, ẑj) jump, let us consider
sup i∗
(
yj, ẑj
)
taken over all possible realisations of sequences {yj} and {ẑj}, conditional on fixed yj−1
and ẑj−1 where i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1) < z∗, i.e. conditional on fixed ẑj < z. Since ẑj is fixed,
sup i∗ (yj, ẑj) is reached by maximising yj (across realisations), subject to equations 7.9,
which define yj as the minimum state such that there is a learning update. The maximum
yj under such constraint solves
i∗
(
yj − 1, ẑj) = i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1) .
Namely, yj reaches its maximum when the adjacent lower state yj − 1 just almost results
in a learning update. Figure 4 depicts the maximum yj for given yj−1 and ẑj−1.
Figure 4 shows that the maximum difference between i∗ (yj, ẑj) and i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1)
depends on the slope of H (i, ẑj) relative to 1/θ, and the size of θ relative to 1. If
H (i, ẑj) is steep relative to 1/θ, then it is more likely that i∗ (yj, ẑj)− i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1) will
be larger, as H (i, ẑj) could dip and intersect (yj − i) /θ at a higher i. However, note
that the parameter scale has been implicitly defined relative to 1, and there is no a priori
restriction on how large or small the scale must be. If the parameter scale specifies θ,
κ and n to be very large relative to 1, on the diagram the functions (yj − i) /θ will be
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very close to each other, whilst H (i, ẑj) appears unchanged (as it is defined in terms
of κ and n). With such scale, i∗ (yj, ẑj) − i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1) will be small. In the limit of
infinite scale (but finite ratios between θ, κ and n), i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1) ↑ i∗ (yj, ẑj), implying
that i∗
(
yj
∗−1, ẑj
∗−1) is arbitrarily close to z∗ leading to maximum hysteresis. Viewed in
this light, the possibility of a premature switch is merely an artifact of the discreteness
of the space Y . Thus the mechanism underlying our earlier observation that infrequent
learning updates may result in less hysteresis is operating in our model, but can be
directly controlled by the choice of parameter scale. In general, a near maximum amount
of hysteresis is expected under sequential learning, with the only real hindrance being a
technical one. The following proposition summarises the results regarding hysteresis.
Proposition 4. As θ, κ and n→∞,
yj
∗ → z∗ + θ
i.e. there is a maximum hysteresis in the limit where there is an infinite number of
learning updates..
8 Uniform Prior Example
Some explicit results for uniform prior distribution will now be derived. The example
corresponds to h = 0, where a unique equilibrium is always guaranteed by proposition
3.
Under the uniform prior
H (i) =
i− z
|z|
implying
H (i) =
κ
n
(8.1)
H (i, ẑt) =
κ
i− ẑt . (8.2)
Consider first the static case without sequential learning. Using 8.1, the solution to
equation 6.3 is given by
i∗ (y) = y − κ
n
θ (8.3)
with the corresponding switching state
y∗ (z) = min {y ∈ Y | i∗ (y) > z∗}
= min
{
y ∈ Y | y > z∗ + κ
n
θ
}
= min
{
y ∈ Y | y > z + κ
(
1 +
θ
n
)}
. (8.4)
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When κ is high, so that a high regime only requires a few agents coordinating on
investing, a high regime is easier to sustain and is more likely for exogenous reasons. The
exogenous effect of κ is captured by z∗, i.e. a higher κ means the decisive agent has a
lower cost for any fixed z. In addition, a higher κ also induces more agents to invest,
as the equilibrium cut-off agent given by 8.3 is decreasing in κ, so that the high regime
is also more likely for endogenous reasons. The factor κ/n in the equilibrium solution
8.3 may be interpreted as a measure of tolerance; at any state y, there are θ agents
without a dominant strategy, but a proportion κ/n of which chooses to invest by iterated
dominance. The parameter κ therefore has both exogenous and endogenous implications.
The total effect of κ is summarised in the equilibrium switching state 8.4 by the multiplier
term 1 + θ/n.
Next, we turn our attention to the sequential learning. An equilibrium, guaranteed
to be unique by proposition 3, is given by the solution to
max
{
κ
i− ẑt , 1
}
=
yt − i
θ
.
A corner solution is obtained if H (yt − θ, ẑt) ≥ 1, i.e. if ẑt ≥ yt − θ − κ. Otherwise the
unique equilibrium is an interior solution, given by the greater solution4 to the quadratic
equation
κ
i− ẑt =
yt − i
θ
namely
i∗ (yt, ẑt) =
yt + ẑt +
√
(yt − ẑt)2 − 4κθ
2
. (8.5)
Given this solution, we can attempt to construct the sequences of belief updates
and states at which there is a learning update, as defined by 7.8 and 7.9. From sequence
7.8, we have
ẑ0 = i∗ (y0)− κ
= y0 − κ
(
1 +
θ
n
)
ẑj = i∗
(
yj−1, ẑj−1
)− κ, j = 1, 2, ... (8.6)
To construct the sequence {yj} according to sequence 7.9, let us solve for the minimum
y satisfying the following inequality
i∗
(
y, ẑj
)
> i∗
(
yj−1, ẑj−1
)
.
4It can be checked that the smaller solution is always less than yt− θ, and can never be a fixed point
over [yt − θ, yt].
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Substitute the solution from equation 8.5 for the L.H.S, use ẑj = i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1)− κ, and
simplify the inequality to get√
(κ+ y − i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1))2 − 4κθ > κ− y + i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1)
y > i∗
(
yj−1, ẑj−1
)
+ θ.
Thus we have
y0 = min {y ∈ Y | y > i∗ (y0) + θ}
= min
{
y ∈ Y | y > y0 + θ
(
1− κ
n
)}
yj = min
{
y ∈ Y | y > i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1)+ θ} , j = 1, 2, ... (8.7)
Proposition 4 obviously still applies in the present case. Following sequence 8.7,
which shows how the discreteness of Y imposes restrictions on the learning, let us define
j < 1 by
j ≡ yj − i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1)− θ.
Combining this with sequence 8.6 and substituting in 8.5, we get
i∗
(
yj, ẑj
)
=
yj + ẑj +
√
(yj − ẑj)2 − 4κθ
2
= i∗
(
yj−1, ẑj−1
)
+
1
2
[
θ − κ+ j +
√
(θ + κ+ j)2 − 4κθ
]
.
Clearly as j becomes negligible, i.e. as θ and κ become large, then we have i∗ (yj−1, ẑj−1) ↑
i∗ (yj, ẑj), and i∗
(
yj
∗−1, ẑj
∗−1)→ z∗ so that the equilibrium approaches a corner solution
of maximum hysteresis.
9 Conclusion
This paper investigates the potential link between information availability and fluctu-
ations. The model studied is essentially a dynamic coordination game with Bayesian
learning, whereby the equilibrium outcome is sequentially observed over time. The global
game technique is shown to be applicable, and is used to derive a sufficient condition for
a unique equilibrium. Sequential learning is found to have two key implications. Firstly,
at the technical level, it is shown that the global game technique when cast in a dynamic
context may become less powerful if learning is allowed, as the posteriors may become less
diffuse over time. Secondly, sequential learning serves as a strong propagation mechanism
in the dynamic coordination game considered. In our model, learning and equilibrium
play reinforce each other, causing the equilibrium to exhibit a strong hysteresis property.
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The fact that the economy is in a boom sends a signal to agents that the economy is
healthy, encouraging them to keep investing thereby sustaining the boom and so on.
It is instructive to contrast our approach with Caplin and Leahy (1994), who
also model market crashes in an environment where agents learn about the unobserved
fundamental in deciding whether to invest. They study the process by which agents
learn about the fundamental by observing the actions of others who receive a stream of
independent private signals about the fundamental. When one agent stops investing, she
signals her private information to others. The market crashes when a sufficient number
of agents stop investing, sending a strong signal to others who then follow suit. Before
such a crash, the market is in a ‘business as usual’ phase, where most agents continue
investing. There is a built-in persistence in Caplin and Leahy (1994), which is generated
by assuming that investment is irreversible, so that switching action is costly (cancellation
and reinvestment involves installation costs). In this regard, their model is similar to
the conventional approach of generating persistence or hysteresis via the switching cost
(employed, for example, in Dixit (1989)). As agents delay changing their actions due
to private switching costs, they also delay transmitting their private information to the
public, leading to aggregate persistence.
In contrast, agents in our model can change their actions costlessly at any period,
and therefore there is no frictions in the decision making per se. There is a friction
in the information processing however, as agents in our model only learn about an
aggregate summary of private signals (i.e. the regime), and not the individual details
thereof. This crucially leads to the one-sided nature of our learning, and it leads to
persistence of actions via a mechanism that is different from that in Caplin and Leahy
(1994). The novel feature of our model is that persistence is made possible by the presence
of strategic complementarity, which involves direct strategic interactions between players,
rather than individual switching costs. This feature allows for our usage of global game
technique in solving for a unique equilibrium. On the other hand, the interactions between
agents in Caplin and Leahy (1994) are purely informational. Indeed, there are in general
many equilibria in the model of Caplin and Leahy (1994) (the authors characterise the
equilibrium set in terms of lower and upper bounds on the exit time), and it is unclear
how to select among these potentially many equilibria.
Furthermore, in Caplin and Leahy (1994), the market needs not crash, provided that
the fundamental is sufficiently good. If agents in their model learn that the profitability is
high, then they remain invested until the final period, thus the issue of delay or hysteresis
does not always arise. In our model, the market necessarily crashes, and the only question
is when. Our model therefore places a much greater emphasis on the strategic delay, and
its interaction with the information generating process, using a dynamic coordination
game as the building block. As our interest lies on the timing of the crash, it is desirable
to characterise the equilibrium set as sharply as possible, and the applicability of iterated
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dominance as a tool is an attractive feature of our model.
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